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and to exert the influence of arts, if not of arms, over the whole southern continent. She will be the first to follow in our steps, for the character of her people, more closely than that of any other of the Spanish races, resembles our own. Her geographical position is the most commanding one south of the equator, and, united with her energy and enterprise, will give her the control of that portion of the Pacific. It becomes "The great Republic of the North" to cultivate the most intimate relations with this, her most promising, disciple. The friendship will be a mutual good, and a blessing to those vast regions which lie between them, whose destinies must be moulded in a greater or less degree by those of Chile and the United States.

ART. II. — *English Grammar: The English Language in its Elements and Forms, with a History of its Origin and Development*. Designed for Use in Colleges and Schools. By WILLIAM C. FOWLER, late Professor of Rhetoric in Amherst College. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850. 8vo. pp. 675.

ENGLISH GRAMMARS succeed each other like almanacs, equally abundant, and almost as ephemeral. Every publisher must have his own; and, year after year, this is replaced by another, which professes to have made sundry unheard of discoveries in the mode of teaching the vernacular; to have invented some novel and ingenious contrivances and simplifications in arranging or illustrating the technicalities of the parts of speech; in short, to have smoothed down ancient roughnesses, sweetened the bitter roots of learning, and made grammar attractive and easy to beginners. Of course, the last is always perfect, or as nearly so as human infirmity can achieve; while all its predecessors are incontrovertible trash. But just as we are beginning to congratulate ourselves that at length something has been accomplished, — lo! the last that was is the last no longer; a later still appears, and its immediate predecessor is forthwith consigned to the ever-growing heap of antiquated rubbish.

Perhaps the peculiar simplicity of the English language,

in its grammatical structure, defining so little by specific form, and leaving so much to the combinations and arrangements of theoretical ingenuity, is what renders it so facile a subject to be practised upon by the ignorant and presuming. A certain modicum of philosophizing acumen finds here one of its readiest modes of gratification. Perhaps, also, in this country, there is a greater divergence between the written and the spoken language than in England; and this may be an occasion for the comparative abundance of grammars produced in America, — the English being here treated in some degree as a dead language; that is, as a language of books.

But perhaps, after all, the phenomenon among us may find its sufficient explanation in that of the more general phenomenon of the unparalleled multiplication in this country of elementary works of all kinds; a multiplication which is to be ascribed to the wide diffusion of elementary education, creating, on the one hand, a great demand for such works, and, on the other, raising up a large class of minds prepared and disposed to produce them.

The ordinary sort of school grammars, made, for the most part, to get money or to broach some private whim, we should hardly think it worth our while to notice in this Review. But we feel it right to welcome one of a higher character and a wider range. In truth, it is refreshing, in a work on this subject, — a subject at once so dry and so trite, — to meet with something more than mere technicality; something more than a novel theory of classification or alleged expedient for simplifying grammatical instruction; something more, in short, than a mere schoolmaster's hobby, a mere parsing machine, or apparatus for readily transforming children and youth into such machines.

The work of Professor Fowler embodies the results of Latham, and includes, in fact, a large portion of his text *in extenso*, together with interesting extracts from Bosworth and others on the Anglo-Saxon and early English language and literature. It is enriched with exceedingly valuable contributions from the pen of Professor Gibbs, which do honor to American philological talent and research. The whole is completed in its details, digested, and arranged by Professor Fowler, so as to form a thorough and comprehensive work on the history, present state, grammatical structure, and right

use of the English language. As to technical nomenclature and arrangements, he has, wisely as we think, abstained from putting forward any new or favorite theories. As to originality, no thorough English Grammar could be, to any great extent, original, without forfeiting all claims to public attention. Murray, whose name has become almost a synonyme of English Grammar itself, modestly called himself a *compiler*.

Of Professor Fowler's work it is the principal aim to collect and combine in one view the best of what has been said, and what has been best said, by former writers on the English Language; and, bringing it into harmony with the present advanced state of general philological research, to present the whole in a plain and consistent, a practical and comprehensive, *system*.

It is distributed into eight parts: the History, the Phonology, the Orthography, the Etymology, the Logic, the Syntax, the Rhetoric, and the Poetics or Prosody, of the English Language. It will be perceived that a wide range is taken; and, though each part is important and valuable in itself, and all the parts are closely connected, there may yet be a difference of opinion in regard to the propriety of treating all these subjects, especially Logic and Rhetoric, as constituent parts of English Grammar.

There is, indeed, an etymological, and even a historical, use of the word Grammar, according to which it includes the whole department of Letters, History with the rest; but as to the expediency of attempting practically to restore this old encyclopedic character, there may certainly be reasonable doubt. Scarcely any science or study is either absolutely fundamental, or a completely rounded whole. Among all sciences there is a common *vinculum*, — an interchange of good offices. Almost everywhere, something must be taken for granted, and something left for wider application; and however this question of grammatical jurisdiction may be decided, unquestionably Logic and Rhetoric will continue to vindicate their rights as separate, if not independent, departments; they will promulgate and apply their own laws, statutes, and dicta, with regard to the subjects falling within their respective precincts, while all questions of phonology, orthography, etymology, and syntax will still be referred for adjudication to the province of Grammar. Although, therefore, Grammar, in a

broad sense, may be held to include Rhetoric and Logic as subsidiary and complementary to its general design; in a stricter and more appropriate sense, it still must be regarded as a science side by side with them, or rather subordinate and subsidiary to them, inasmuch as it is more elementary in its character.

Having expressed, in the fullest manner, our high sense of the general merits of Professor Fowler's work, we shall now proceed to note certain points in detail, in some of which it seems to us more or less faulty; and we would, in a friendly manner, suggest them to the author for consideration in preparing a new edition of the book, which we are happy to learn is in contemplation.

We regard it as one of the chief merits of this work that it embraces a *transcript* of a large part of that of Professor Latham. In his Preface, Professor Fowler has fully and freely acknowledged his obligations to this author. But we venture to suggest, that the occasional insertion of quotation marks with a few paragraphs only, crediting them to Latham, is calculated to mislead the reader. Either all that is taken word for word from Latham should be credited to him, or none at all. For example, Latham's name is placed at the end of a paragraph with quotation marks on page 219. One would hardly guess that, while this paragraph is itself slightly altered, the two preceding paragraphs are transcribed word for word from the same author. Latham's name is put at the end of the last chapter in Part second, with a reference to a particular page. That chapter is nearly, but not quite, all from him. With the exception of the alphabet and about eight lines of text, which are added, the whole of the first three chapters in Part third are borrowed word for word from him, without any acknowledgment whatever. These are but instances of what is continually occurring in the book. Perhaps it may be said in explanation, that so much as Professor Fowler chooses to adopt as his own, and be responsible for, he takes without acknowledgment, and for the rest he gives the author credit. How far such an explanation is allowable or applicable, we will not take upon us to say.

In Chapter III. Part 1, which by the way is almost all transcribed from Latham, except the specimens of dialects, which are from Bosworth, the phrase, "I have read that,"

used by Latham, is omitted ; and what Latham stated as hearsay is restated by Professor Fowler in his own name, as a positive fact. He may have seen the original authorities, or may speak from personal knowledge.

In the same chapter, page 81, a typographical error is copied from Latham, *shook* for *shake*. Nor is this the only case in which an error is copied or committed in copying. Latham incidentally remarks that "in the present English, (with the exception of the conjugation of the verb substantive,) the subjunctive mood differs from the indicative only in the third person singular." Professor Fowler in all his paradigms has made, and correctly made, a difference also in the second person singular. Yet he has unfortunately incorporated into his Grammar the above sentence as his own, together with more of doubtful character in the same connection, making the matter still worse by leaving out a very important admission of Latham in regard to the *complex* Grammar of the modern German. pp. 56-61.

On page 278, *swoll* is made obsolete, though Latham has not so marked it. Yet on page 280, the following statement occurs, taken as usual without credit from Latham ; "in *swol?* and *swelled* we have two forms, of which *both are current*." Also, more than half of the eighth class of verbs of the "strong conjugation" is made a mere repetition of the seventh, in consequence of confounding Latham's distinction of the two preterites. *Clove* is made obsolete in the seventh, current in the eighth ; preterites *eat* and *sothe* are added, and the unauthorized rather than obsolete preterite *forgot* omitted. Under the second class, it is said, page 274, "Here the preterite ends in *ew*. In these words, the *w* has grown out of a *g*, as may be seen from the Anglo-Saxon forms. The word *see*, Anglo-Saxon *geseah*, belongs to this class." One would naturally infer from this, that *geseah* in Anglo-Saxon meant *see*, and not *saw* ; and he would look in vain to see how in any way it is shown, by the Anglo-Saxon form that *w* has grown out of *g*. Latham's words are : "The word *see* (*saw*) belongs to this class ; since in Anglo-Saxon we find the forms *geseah* and *gesegen*, and in Swedish the preterite form is *saag*." Yet neither author has inserted *see* in the class to which they both say it belongs.

Except the full paradigms, these whole chapters on conju-

gations, are, with a few verbal changes and omissions, taken from Latham. The perfect participles are also added in the strong conjugations, and a few changes are made in the marks for obsolete forms. *Abidden* is given as a current participle of *abide*; and *shew* is given as a current preterite of *show*. By virtue of this fact, *show* is inserted in the second class (in whose preterites *w* has grown out of *g*,) though by Latham it is entirely and rightly omitted. It is not probable that *shew* was ever properly used — certainly not by Anglo-Saxon authority — as a preterite of *show*; and if it were, *show* would belong to the third, and not to the second class. *Swunk* and *swunken* are given as current words from the obsolete *swink*, in the twelfth class, though they are not given at all by Latham, and we are at a loss to know where they are current. *Sprang*, *rang*, and *shrank* are marked obsolete, though allowed, and rightly we think, to be current by Latham; while *clang*, *slang*, and *slank*, *brast*, *grand*, and *wand* are inserted as obsolete preterites, though not recognized by Latham at all.

On page 248, in section 257, all of which is really from Latham, between Nos. 1 and 2, a paragraph is omitted which is essential to the sense of No. 2. "Such a plural (or numeral) inflection" refers in Latham to what is *contrasted* with a *personal* inflection; while here, it is made to refer directly to *personal* inflection, or personal characteristic, if to any thing. Also, by inserting the word "English," a little afterwards, the sense is entirely perverted. Indeed, as this sentence stands, we can make no sense of it whatever consistent with the truth of facts. But we will pursue this matter no further.

The historical sketch of the language combines with the disquisition of Latham, important additions from Bosworth and other sources, and cannot fail to be extremely useful and instructive.

Among the "Americanisms" on page 92, we notice several which we meet as often in modern English as in American books. Very many others are mere local vulgarisms. "Demoralize" is certainly in good use everywhere; and "demoralization" is almost as natural and necessary a consequence from it as "demoralizing." Some of the most striking Americanisms are omitted; but of course, the list does not pro-

fess to be complete. "Fixings" is given, but not the verb "fix," which, in the sense of *arrange*, *fit*, *fit up*, is so firmly *fixed* in American usage that we should be quite at a loss without it.

Professor Gibbs has given a very thorough and amusing development of the cockney dialect; but it seems to us rather too much like a general systematic view of vulgar corruptions. In most of its features, it certainly is found far beyond the limits of the Great Metropolis.

He has also given some interesting illustrations of the natural significance of articulate sounds. In our opinion, views of this kind may be pushed to fanciful extravagances; and we venture to think, that, particularly with reference to the sounds of the vowels, they are here carried to the extreme verge of good reason. The illustrations of so-called natural significance are scarcely traced beyond the Indo-European languages; but if really *natural*, they should pervade all languages. So long as the coincidences are confined to one family, they can be more satisfactorily explained by a known, demonstrable historical connection.

The Phonological Part is a reproduction of Latham's, with some amplification and re-arrangement. Latham's doctrine, which we consider altogether erroneous, in regard to the *ch* (in chin,) or the Italian soft *c*, and to the English *j*, and in regard to the "so-called aspirates," &c., is repeatedly insisted on. In respect to the aspirates, it is reiterated some ten or a dozen times. Yet the statements in this part being occasionally drawn from various other sources, the phraseology is not always consistent. For example, in section 63, "aspirate" is applied to such a sound as *h*; and in section 73, to such a sound as *ph*, though the language in both cases appears as the writer's own. For what in the Tabular View are called "sonants," we find, in different places, no less than five different terms, — *hard*, *flat*, *gross*, *vocal*, *sonant*.

Latham's system of vocalism, or rather his want of system, is for the most part followed. But for describing the *a* in *fat* as the short sound of *a* in *fate*, we believe even Latham's authority can hardly be given. Certainly, however short or quick *fate* is pronounced, it will not thereby become *fat*; and however long *fat* is said or sung, it will not thereby become *fate*.

The *é fermé* is contradistinguished from *a* in *fate*, and the *o chiuso* from *o* in *note*; as though the former, the French and Italian *é* and *o*, were *close*; and the latter, the English *a* and *o*, were *open*. But whatever may be the difference or similarity of the sounds here contrasted, certain it is that both the *a* in *fate* and the *o* in *note* are *close* in the sense of the French *fermé* and the Italian *chiuso*. These terms have nothing to do with what we are accustomed in English to regard as the natural sound of vowels according as they end or do not end syllables; but refer merely to the comparatively narrow passage allowed the breath in their utterance. In this view, the *o* in *note* is close compared with *o* in *nor*, which is open, and the *é* in *été* (like *a* in *fate*) is close compared with *é* in *fête* — like our *e* in *bed* protracted, or like *e* in *merry* or in *there*.

The third and fourth rules for the division of syllables, in section 88, do not seem quite consistent. It would seem by them that, between two vowels, *two* consonants must be separated, and *three* consonants need not be; so that we must say bet-ween, des-pise, prot-ract, pos-tage, &c., and ari-thmetic, illu-strate, pa-ltry, pou-ltry, e-xtreme, e-xcept, &c.

A curious derivation of *nag* is given from Latham. It is said to be from the Danish *ög*, signifying a horse, derived by pronouncing *an ög*, or *an ag* as *a nag*. Some other amusing instances of this sort are given. A remarkable illustration of the converse mode of corruption, resulting, that is to say, from transferring the *n* backwards instead of forwards, might be given in the familiar designation of the arithmetical zero, as *an ought*, instead of *a nought*.

Before *e*, *i*, and *y*, *g* is said "generally to represent the sound of *j* as in *genius*; except *get*, *give*, *gewgaw*, *finger*, and syllables added to words ending in *g*, as *fog*, *foggy*." But the exceptions are by no means exhausted here. Add *anger*, *hunger*, &c., *begin*, *gibbous*, *gills*, *noggin*, *girl*, *gird*, &c., *gild*, *gimp*, *giddy*, *gig*, *gizzard*, *geld*, *giggle*, &c. — indeed, all the Anglo-Saxon, and none of the classical, part of the language. This would be our general rule, and we should then seek for exceptions, if there are any. We presume no exceptions would be found besides those cases in which, as

in *gibbous*, the tradition of the true etymology has been at some period broken off and lost.

On page 166, "a rule of the English language" is quoted as settling forever the question about the proper spelling of such words as *traveller*, *worshipper*; as though the actual facts of the language were not above all rules propounded upon the *ipse dixi* of individuals; and as though those words were not almost always spelled as we have spelled them above, notwithstanding the known and acknowledged general analogy of the language. The rule cited may be a good one, but it cannot be adduced to annihilate exceptions. We might have a preference *a priori* for the omission of the superfluous *l* and *p*; but uniformity of usage, once settled any way, is better than the confusion that must accompany an attempted reform. If the reform could be effected by the fiat of one man, even if it were our own, it should certainly be made. But we are so conservative as to prefer many evils to a state of anarchy. As to such words as *honour*, *favour*, &c., the confusion is already so great that one is doubtless at liberty to choose what he thinks theoretically best, and omit the *u* if he pleases; although we confess we do not like to see *Saviour* curtailed to *Savior*.

In favour of *k* at the end of such words as *public*, *music*, &c., the following argument is brought forward, though not urged as decisive: "As *c* has no determinate sound, being equivalent either [*sic*] at one time to *s* and at another time to *k*, it should never end a word, since the next word may begin either with a broad vowel or a small vowel." This argument, or rather its premise, furnishes to our mind one of the strongest reasons of expediency which can be given for the omission of the final *k*. Because, while it is easy to distinguish the *c* final, like *g* final, as always hard so long as it remains final; yet, when words ending in *c* receive an additional syllable, that syllable may begin with either "a broad vowel or a small vowel;" and in all such cases, the *c* actually takes the sound of *k* or *s* respectively, showing that we presume such final *c* to retain in itself the power of being developed into either sound. Thus, *public*, *publication*, *publicly*, *publicist*; *physic*, *physician*, *physical*; *music*, *musician*, *musical*; *catholic*, *catholicity*, *catholicon*, &c. If the *k* final were added, it would be necessary to omit it again before *e*, *i*, and *y*, and

it would be a mere incumbrance before any other letter. On this principle, we should propose to spell such verbs as *physick* and *frollick* with the *k*, since, in their inflections, as *physicking*, *frollicked*, it must needs be inserted.

The definition given of Etymology seems rather confused. First a strict etymological sense is given, then a sense "by extension;" whereupon the latter is called the "limited sense," and the former the "wide sense." This is not the most encouraging augury in entering upon this branch of the subject, whose chief and most difficult office it is to distinguish and define the several parts of speech and their various forms of inflection.

The definitions of all the parts of speech are, in our opinion, faulty, in consequence of introducing into each of them the little word "*can*." Thus; "a word which *can* by itself form the copula of a proposition, or which *can* by itself form the copula and predicate of a proposition, and *can* express an assertion, is called a *verb*." Now the word *ship* or *man* "*can*" fulfil the conditions of the second alternative; as, "will you ship that man?" "They man the ship;" or the word *love*; as, "I love him for his love to you." But these words come also under the definition of nouns. How then shall we distinguish a noun from a verb? We think it must be by the office which it *does* perform, rather than by that which it *can* perform. In regard to a large proportion of words in English, we cannot say that, in themselves, or by virtue of any constant or inherent *power* or property, they belong to this or that part of speech; but we have to determine their classification by the office which they happen, in each case, actually to perform. Of course, Professor Fowler is fully aware of this fact; he states it broadly. "The same word," says he, "may (or *can*) in different situations belong to different classes." But what then becomes of the whole set of elaborate definitions? Moreover, if, as is stated on page 451, "the copula, as a separate element, uncombined with a predicate, has not yet been found to exist in any language, and consequently has not yet been shown to constitute a separate part of speech," what becomes of the first alternative in the foregoing definition? "Sometimes," it is added, "even the substantive verb itself is both copula and predicate;" what is it then at other times? Is it merely predicate, or merely

copula? Certainly, it is not merely predicate; it must therefore be merely copula; and if so, is it not a "separate element?" Is it not a "part of speech?" That it is of necessity combined syntactically or logically with other elements or parts of speech, will not prove it to be itself no separate element or part of speech, unless all the other parts of speech are to be annihilated with it; for, however it may be with the Chinese, it would be difficult, in English, to contrive any statement which should not combine more than one "element," or to find any "element" which, "separate and uncombined" with any other expressed or implied, could convey a logical sense.

Let us not be thought hypercritical. In formal definitions, we think it reasonable to insist both upon the greatest possible precision and upon the greatest possible conciseness. With special reference to the grounding and perfecting of such definitions, the aid of logical forms has been invoked in the work before us, as a constituent part of *English Grammar*. Yet in the Logical part, and after all the light which all the syllogistic forms and figures could concentrate upon the subject, these definitions are repeated with the same objectionable features. Thus: "a word capable of forming by itself both the predicate and copula of a proposition is called a verb." Here the intention seems to be to make one change, namely,—to give up entirely the first alternative of the former definition; while the "can" is still retained under the form of "capable."

Not only is the generic use of the definite article excluded altogether from the definition, pp. 217–18, but it is emphatically declared that "a principal office of the articles is to reduce a noun substantive from a general to a particular signification." Also, in the Syntax, where the uses of the definite article are given *in extenso*, occupying nearly two pages under ten heads, its generic use, as in the phrase, "the rose is always beautiful," is entirely ignored.

"The subjunctive mode expresses *conditional* assertion;" and, "the potential expresses assertions implying *contingency*," &c. What is the difference intended? Also, may not the potential mood be either indicative, as "he may go," or subjunctive, as, "if he can come," or optative, as, "may he be?" The last use is ignored altogether. Moreover, as

the potential mood may be optative, or conditional, or obligatory, or volitional, or necessitative, or permissive, &c., as well as potential, would it not be better, as a matter of words, to call it the auxiliary or compound mood? Some might even suggest as its name the *omnium gatherum*, or "residuary legatee of all the moods."

The imperative mood is said to "express the will of the speaker," and to be "used for desired existence." So is the indicative; as, "I will have it," "thou shalt not kill;" and the potential; as, "may it be so." The infinitive is said not to be "limited to any particular subject." But in the phrases, "he desires to learn," "I wish him to learn," "he is able to learn," &c., is not *learn* as much limited to the particular subject *he* or *him*, as it is in the phrases, "he *will* learn," "may he learn," he can learn," &c.?

We think, with Whately, it would be well, and would prevent no little confusion of thought and statement, to recognize the form in *ing* as being sometimes a form of the infinitive mood.

We do not mean to say that Professor Fowler's definitions are unusually faulty, or that we could frame a better set. We are fully aware that this is at once the most difficult and the most defective portion of English Grammar. But we believe that the defect may be, in a great degree, remedied; and we would call special attention to the importance of having formulas of definition logically correct and consistent, and at the same time, if possible, plain and concise,—as well for the sake of grammatical science, as for the convenience of learners. A learner cannot get distinct ideas from loose definitions. He may not be led astray by a false definition; but it can only be either because the subject is plainer without the definition than with it, or because he gets no idea of the subject at all.

The definitions in this Grammar are far above the average in accuracy. It contains none to be compared for looseness with some which we have noted in the fiftieth edition of a very modern grammar highly recommended and much used in our New England schools. One there finds such definitions as this: "Words which denote *what* any thing does, has done, or will do, are called verbs." And thus we are forthwith assured that this class of words is "explained."

From which it appears, that those three tenses are so many kinds of verbs and all the kinds of verbs there are ; so that such a word as *did*, or any other word in the imperfect or preterite tense, is not a verb ; not to speak of a pluperfect and second future. Moreover, while, by this definition, *to be* and *to be loved*, &c., are not verbs, *duty*, *favor*, *work*, &c., are verbs in the phrases, "he does his duty ; does me a favor ; does work for us, &c."

In that same Grammar, fiftieth edition, the definitions of all the tenses are like the following : "The perfect tense denotes what has taken place ! " Is not this an exquisitely accurate and instructive formula for pupils to commit to memory ? and must not such an "inductive system" quite revolutionize our scholastic and antiquated notions of English Grammar ? "*What* has taken place ;" not *when* it took place. *There has been a storm* ; — *what* has taken place ? A storm surely ; therefore a *storm* is the present tense. Q. E. D. Besides, these definitions assume the very point to be defined, and remind us of an effort of a friend of ours to distinguish between *bile* and *boil* ; thus, "*bile* is *when* you have a *bile*, and *boil* is *when* the pot *boils*." Such statements may somehow suggest ideas, but they scarcely deserve the honor of being printed and published fifty times over, as formal definitions in a Grammar of extraordinary scientific pretensions, to be conned and committed to memory by a whole generation. In our opinion, the habit of loose and lazy thinking, engendered and encouraged in the minds of the young by familiarity with such formal and stereotyped indefinitenesses, is a far greater evil than can be counterbalanced by all the good to be derived from studying English Grammar before the pupil is able to master a thoroughly logical statement on so abstruse a subject.

Under Gender, Professor Fowler states, by an oversight, that *beau*, *belle* ; *gander*, *goose* ; *lad*, *lass* ; *master*, *mistress* ; &c., "have no etymological relation to each other." *Chicken* is said to be the plural of *chick*, page 193 ; while Professor Gibbs states, correctly, that it is a diminutive from *cock*, page 420.

As to genitives of proper names ending in *s*, we think good English usage decidedly inclines, with Professor Fowler, regularly to add another *s* after the apostrophe, both in

speaking and writing ; as “he lives at Mr. Harris’s.” As the general exception, we would suggest classical and scripture names, where the final *s* is preceded by a vowel ; — an exception which seems to arise from the fact that, in the classical languages, such names took no additional *s* in the genitive.

Both in declension and conjugation, *you* is set down as one form of the *singular* number. We demur. Whether the real fact be better expressed by describing *you* as a *plural form used for the singular*, or as actually a *singular form*, is the question. If the latter view be adopted, then, on the same principles, the *Usted* of the Spaniards, the *ella* (or *lei*) of the Italians, the *Sie* of the Germans, — each requiring a verb in the third person, — as well as the *vous* of the French, requiring a verb in the second person plural, — would all be called, together with their respective verbs of course, *second person singular number*.

My is said to be a form originally accusative, from Anglo-Saxon *mec* ; *meh* ; Germ. *mich* ; Icel. *mik*, &c. This is from Latham. Whereas, on page 231, Professor Gibbs, in his zeal to show that *my* and *mine*, *thy* and *thine*, are only two forms respectively of the same word, and both alike possessive cases, declares that *my* as well as the other forms, is derived from an ancient genitive. In this case, we are inclined to side with Latham. But, at all events, as Latham’s doctrine and that of Professor Gibbs both stand as a part of the regular text, the Grammar is chargeable with an inconsistency which should not have been allowed.

Indeed, Professor Gibbs’s whole argument on this point seems to us unsatisfactory, and we are disposed to consider the whole question still an open one. He lays down as his thesis, that “there is in the English language no possessive adjective pronoun, distinct from the possessive case of the substantive pronoun.” His first reason, that “adjectives in English are not inflected,” in our view, is as good a reason on the other side ; for it shows that the possessive adjective pronouns, if there are any, need not be declined ; they need only perform the office of adjectives. His second reason is his view of the derivation of *my* and *mine*, *thy* and *thine*, as stated above. His third reason is, that “the difference between *my* and *mine*, *thy* and *thine*, is merely euphonic.” In some

cases it may be ; but is it so in all ? We may say, " my hour," or " mine hour ;" though, if euphony be pleaded in favor of the latter, it is remarkable that it has nevertheless become almost obsolete. But is it a violation of mere euphony to say, " it is my ?" The same form was originally used for *a* or *an*, as for *one*. Do these words, therefore, differ only euphonically, so that it is only the cacophony which forbids us to say, " you have a book, and I have *a* ?" And, moreover, is *one* just as much an indefinite article as *a* or *an* ? see page 496. In like manner, is *that* just as much a definite article as *the*, inasmuch as they both have the same etymology, and differ perchance only euphonically ? And, finally, Professor Gibbs's whole argument rests upon the words *my* and *mine*, *thy* and *thine* ; but even if it be conclusive in regard to those words, his thesis will not be established until it is shown, that *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, and *hers* differ only euphonically from *our*, *your*, *their*, and *her*. Is there not an effort, in all those cases, to give a prominent genitive character to what is conceived of as distinctively a true genitive case, by reduplicating its genitive form ? And will not the same view apply also to *mine* and *thine* even, as being formed from an old genitive in *n*, just as the vulgar are still tempted to say, *his'n*, *her'n*, *your'n* ? But as we have said, we consider this whole question as yet unsettled. We only add that we perfectly agree with Professor Gibbs in not regarding *mine*, *thine*, &c., as pronouns in the nominative or accusative case. Such a view seems to us a mere grammatical monstrosity.

On page 233, a long argument is given (from Latham) to show that, in English, *self* is a substantive ; and though Latham admits that "*sylfa* in Anglo-Saxon, from which *self* is derived, was declined like an adjective," yet we are told again, on page 507, that "*self*, now called a pronoun, was originally a substantive."

We incline, on the other hand, decidedly to call it, as it has usually been called, a reflex or reflective pronoun. Nobody ever thought of calling its etymological correspondents in Anglo-Saxon or German, or its Latin or Greek equivalents, substantives. Taking Latham's view of *my* and *thy* as being from forms originally accusative, we should have *myself*, *thysself*, *himsself*, *hersself*, *itsself*, and *themselves*, all formed consistently. *Ourselves* for *us-selves*, and *yourselves*, for *you-*

selves, remain abnormal, and may be either euphonic changes or corruptions arising from mistaken analogies ; just as the genitive *its* was, in etymological ignorance, substituted for *his*. Professor Fowler, following Latham, considers it doubtful whether the *s* in *itself* belongs to the *self*, or to the *its* (omitting that with *self*.) But as *its* was not used in the translation of the Bible, and as *itself* occurs, (e. g., 1 Cor. xiii. 5.) it is clear that it was originally compounded of *it* and *self*, and not of *its* and *self*.

On page 506, we are told that "the word *self* is used as a reflective personal pronoun, for want of some word in English equivalent to the Latin *se*, the German *sich*, and the Scandinavian *sik* and *sig* ; as, 'I hurt myself,' &c." But what has *myself* to do with *se*, or *sich*, or *sik* ? The Latin is *ipse* or *me-ipsū*, the German *ich selbst*, or *mich selbst*. *Self* is etymologically of an adjective character, and therefore does not naturally stand alone.

"According to Latham, *he she, it* are demonstrative pronouns." So they are, sometimes ; as, "he who studies learns." And it is a remarkable use of language that Professor Fowler calls them in such cases (page 503) "*indefinite*"; and yet more remarkable, perhaps, that he should call this "the *same* indefinite manner" which is exemplified in the phrase "*you* may trust an honest man." But those pronouns are not always either "demonstrative" or "indefinite." They are also used in those cases where, in Latin and Greek, the nominative was omitted, and where not so much a demonstration, as a mere personal or numerical distinction, requires to be marked.

A detailed account is professedly given (pp. 237 and 238) of the relative pronouns ; and among other statements we have the following : "Third, *what* sometimes stands for an indefinite idea ; as, 'he cares not what he says or does.'" Then again, on page 513 : "*Who* is sometimes used indefinitely, without an antecedent ; as, 'I do not care who did it.'" Why are these two statements put so far asunder ? and why was not *which* somewhere included in the same category ? as, "I do not care which I take ?" and finally, do they not all come under the same analogy as the "responsives," so-called, mentioned on page 239 ; as, "I neither know nor care who wrote it, which wrote it, nor what he wrote ?"

In "one says," &c., the *one* is probably from the French *on*. "This is so far substantival," says Professor Fowler, "that it is inflected. Genitive singular, *one's own self*; plural, *my wife and little ones are well*." The genitive is of very modern introduction, and is most likely from the French *on*; but the plural *ones* certainly is not.

On the whole, *possessive* adjective pronouns seem to have been discarded in this Grammar; yet the term "adjective pronouns" is applied to a certain class of words. Now, possessive adjective pronouns, where they exist, are true adjective pronouns; that is, they possess, at the same time and in the same case, the properties and character of pronouns and adjectives. They refer, as pronouns, to some antecedent for which they are substituted, and they point out a relation with respect to some following noun, like adjectives. Indeed, the genitive case in general has an adjective nature. But, besides the possessives, are there any other adjective pronouns which are used at once in both characters? It is not enough that they sometimes perform one office, and sometimes another. At that rate, *love* might be called a verbal noun.

The words *which* and *what* have sometimes both characters; but strangely enough, they are entirely omitted in the list of adjective pronouns here enumerated. If Buttmann's definition, quoted at the head of the chapter, is relied upon, it seems to us it will prove too much. For if "all words which, instead of naming or describing an object, enable us to distinguish it by some relations, are pronouns, or have a pronominal character," we do not see why *present* and *absent*, *near*, *distant*, and *yonder*; *like*, *similar*, *higher*, *lower*; and indeed most *comparatives*, and many other adjectives, have not as good claims to a pronominal character as any other.

Any is said, "after negative words, to mark the exclusion of all," and again, to "be equivalent to every." But does not the accompanying negative mark all the exclusion that is marked, and is not *any* always indefinite, while *every* is always distributive? With *any*, you may choose *which*, and *how many*, you will take; but with *every*, there is no choice; you must take all, only one by one.

Professor Fowler has given a far more satisfactory account of the so-called auxiliary verbs than is usual in English Gram-

mars. It is too often the case that we are presented with a list of certain verbs, which are declared to be "auxiliary" verbs, *because* they are "helping" verbs. But why just those, and no more, are enumerated, it would puzzle any logician to divine.

This Grammar gives, somewhat confusedly and in different places, three definitive tests of auxiliary verbs; — First, "They perform the same office in the conjugation of principal verbs which inflection does in the classical languages." But the so-called auxiliaries perform also other offices; thus, "he may" = "he is permitted;" "I can" = "I am able to" = *possum* = *δύναμαι*; "he should" = "he ought to" = *debet*; "he must" = "il faut qu'il" = *oportet* = *δεῖ* or *χρῆ*; "I will" = *volo* = *θέλω*; &c. Some of the English auxiliaries, remaining true auxiliaries, do not perform this office; as *do*, for example. And finally, there seems no good reason for stretching the English language precisely upon the Procrustean bed of the classical. Second, "They are followed by other verbs without the prefix *to* in the infinitive." And so are many non-auxiliary verbs. Besides, to the auxiliaries *have* and *be*, such a test is not applicable. This test might have been strengthened by adding, that they are not themselves used in the infinitive with or without the prefix *to*, and consequently cannot take any auxiliary before them; that they have no participles; and that they do not take the characteristic *s* in the third person singular of the present indicative. But this would only show that they are *defective*, like *ought*, or *quoth*; the last characteristic is equally applicable to *need* and *dare*; and *have* and *be*, with *do* in part, would still remain exceptions. Third, "The power of the verb as an auxiliary is a modification of the original power which it had as a non-auxiliary." Here we have at length the true and decisive test, or at least an approximation to such a test. Yet it is immediately lost sight of. It only flashes upon us like a blaze of lightning in a dark night.

The distinctions between *shall* and *will*, and the modified significance of the other auxiliaries, as connected with their respective etymologies, are very neatly, though not quite fully, set forth. This is chiefly transcribed from Latham. But were it not so very familiar a phenomenon in English Grammars, it would be quite surprising, that, in the detailed account

given of the offices of *should* and *would*, one of the most frequent, if not the most frequent *par excellence*, is entirely omitted; namely, the *conditional*; as, "I should, or he would go, if circumstances permitted."

Can is said to be sometimes equivalent to *will*. Now, we object to introducing the theory of moral ability and inability into English Grammar, and stamping what may be a tropical or analogical use of words as grammatical and literal. When one says, "God *cannot* lie," one refers just as much to *ability*, and just as much to *will*, and no more, as the Latin *potest*, or the Greek *δύναται* does, or as if one said in English, "God *is not able*," or, "it is *impossible* for God to lie."

In connection with the auxiliaries, the theory of the moods comes up again. In section 271, our criticisms on the definition of the Potential mood are fully sustained; yet without any practical results. In the preceding section, it is shown, in the words of Latham, that with the exception of *were* and *wert* for *was* and *wast*, there is no subjunctive mood in English; and that there is no imperative. And if auxiliaries are, as Latham proposes, to be referred to Syntax, and if prepositions constitute a separate part of speech, there will be no infinitive, and no potential, and consequently no mood at all, in English.

Now it is extremely important to settle distinctly, if it may be, and once for all, on what principles moods and auxiliary verbs in their mutual relations shall be treated in English Grammar.

First, The moods may be treated as peculiar forms or inflections which a verb presents to express the various modes of thought or affections of the mind. In this sense Latham treats them above, and in this sense there are no moods at all in our language.

Secondly, The distinction of moods may be based upon definitions. Thus, so many moods may be defined *a priori* as may be thought *convenient*; for to lay down as distinctions for different moods all the various affections of thought, without some regard to convenience as a limit, would be to make their number indefinite. This is ostensibly the procedure of English Grammar generally. But as we have seen, it is exposed to great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. If the distinctions made are based upon logical definitions, then

those definitions should be rigidly and logically applied, both inclusively and exclusively.

Thirdly, The distinction of moods may be based upon certain observed forms of phraseology to be described and enumerated instead of definitions. Thus, so many verbs may be assumed as auxiliaries, as, from their brevity, their frequent use, their peculiarity of form, or their correspondence with the inflections of other languages, may be thought convenient. The verbs may then be conjugated with these auxiliaries, and the complex forms or phrases thence arising may be arbitrarily distributed into a convenient number of classes, to be called moods, with conventional names ; — the application of these names to be determined, not by any definition based upon the forms of thought, but solely by the external juxtaposition of certain words. This method is, not professedly, but really, pursued in the practical application of *English Grammar* to the English language, as ordinarily conducted. It is very loose, but may be convenient. If it is practised, it had better be openly acknowledged and understood.

Fourthly, There remains a fourth method, which may have its difficulties, but which probably is, more or less distinctly, the ideal floating before the minds of most English grammarians ; and which we would fain see systematically developed and thoroughly applied, if possible.

The first step is to define the infinitive mood, which may be done substantially thus : — (*a*) the infinitive is that state of the verb which admits no inflection of number or person to limit it to any particular subject. (*b*) Its subject must be either indefinite, or in the accusative case, or, if in the nominative, must be *immediately* the subject of another verb or verbal expression, on which the infinitive itself must depend. (*c*) It has two forms, one usually with *to* prefixed, as *to learn*, another terminating in *ing*, as *loving* ; and it is essentially in the same regimen, for the most part, as a substantive noun.

The next step is to determine the number and character of auxiliary verbs. With this view, observe what verbs, by modifying or abandoning their independent and proper significance, are subordinated to other verbs ; and thus, without the intervention of any intermediate particle to express any relation between their own meaning, which they have lost, and that of those other verbs, serve merely to designate the

formal relations of the latter ; — and call them, when so used, auxiliary verbs.

The test of an auxiliary verb will therefore be, the loss or modification of its independent or intrinsic import, in order to serve a merely subordinate and formal purpose. Its *immediate* junction with the verb, whose formal relations it serves to indicate, follows as a matter of course. According to this test, we think we should have the following, and only the following, auxiliary verbs ; *do, be, have, shall, will, may, and let*. These, it must be carefully observed, are not always auxiliary, but all of them often retain their original independent significance. *Can* and *must* always retain that significance, and are therefore never properly auxiliary. *Können* and *müssen* in German, and *possum* in Latin, would have as good a right to that character ; and even *need* and *dare* in English ; thus, “ he may not, he cannot, he shall not, he must not, he need not, he dare not, do it.”

Do, as an auxiliary, serves, — first, sometimes a merely euphonic purpose, as in the ordinary forms of negative and interrogative sentences ; secondly, sometimes an expletive, or intensive, or antithetic purpose, as in the so-called emphatic form. It does not furnish a basis for any distinction of *moods*, unless the forms above-mentioned, negative, interrogative, and intensive, be so called.

Be is used as an auxiliary, first, to form, with the present participle, a peculiar conjugation of the active voice implying continuity of action, with emphatic reference to distinctions of tense ; and secondly, to form, with the past participle, the passive voice. But unless the signification of the *be* is modified, there is no true passive voice. The same expression may be passive in one case and not in another, or it may be passive or not, in a given case, according to the precise form under which we conceive of the meaning. Thus ; “ he was married when I saw him,” and, “ he was married yesterday, at ten o'clock.” In the latter phrase, we have a true passive verb ; the meaning of the *was* has become merely formal, — “ he received the rite of marriage,” &c. But in the former phrase, “ was married ” may or may not be passive. It probably is not. But, if it is so conceived, it is not in the imperfect or preterite, but preterperfect tense, — either, “ he was a married man,” or, “ he *had* received the rite of marriage, when I

saw him." The true passive verb does not occur so frequently in English as is commonly supposed.

Be, being conjugated as an auxiliary through all *moods*, does not furnish any basis for a distinction of *moods*.

Have is used as an auxiliary with the perfect participle; first, in its present form, to constitute the perfect; secondly, in its preterite form, to constitute the preterperfect, of the principal verb. In these cases, its independent meaning is plainly lost or greatly modified; but it distinguishes only *tenses*, not *moods*.

Shall and *will* are used as auxiliaries before the present tense of the principal verb, to constitute the simple future; and the future of *have*, thus formed, is used with the perfect participle to constitute the future perfect.

Both these verbs are often used without serving any such formal purpose, but with a proper and independent significance of their own. They ought not then to be considered, though they generally are, as constituting the future tense. When they merely *predict*, they are mere auxiliaries, and form a future; but when *will* expresses volition, consent, or promise, corresponding to *volo*, *vouloir*, *wollen*; and when *shall* expresses determination, destination, or duty, corresponding to *devoir* or *sollen* — as they may in almost any connection — they are no longer properly considered auxiliary verbs; as, "I have been trying to persuade him, but he will not go;" "I will not go;" "he that shall come will come." In the two first cases, *will*, and in the last case, *shall*, are not used to *predict*, but have their proper and independent sense.

As auxiliaries, *shall* sometimes performs the office of indicating the future, rather than *will*; sometimes *will* rather than *shall*. Clearly to distinguish these cases has long been considered a desideratum. "I shall fall," "he will fall," "shall I fall?" "will it fall?" "when, or if, I shall fall, or he shall fall," "who or which shall fall" (contingently,) or "will fall" (categorically,) "I say that I shall fall," "he says that he himself shall fall," "he says that James will fall," — these are the future forms, and may be generalized as one has leisure. "I will go," "he shall go," "shall he go?" "when he will go," "whoever will go," "he says that he himself will go," "he says that James shall go;" — in these cases, *will* and *shall* have their proper intrinsic meaning, and, though they

may, as defective verbs, be either *present* or *future* themselves, they do not constitute a future of the subsequent verb in the infinitive. Without emphasis, the *will* and *shall* imply consent; with emphasis, determination. In the future forms, they *may* have these senses; thus, "he will go," may be simply future in one case; in another, particularly in the interrogative form, it may imply consent, as, "will he go?"—in another, determination, as, "I have tried to dissuade him, but he *will* go," "I have asked him, but he will not give it to me." But observe, this sense is not distinguished by the mere emphasis, but by the connection which determines the direction of the antithesis. Thus, in the following phrase, the *will* is emphatic, but only emphatically future: "you think it will not fall; but it *will* fall, I am sure." So with *shall*, in such phrases as "he says that I shall go," "shall I go?" it may express a mere prediction or a determination, or ask permission; and the sense must be ascertained from the drift of the discourse. The usage of the second person in regard to *shall* and *will* is the same as that of the third, with one exception; to express the simple future in the interrogative form, we say, "shall you go?" and not, "will you go?" The forms, "will I go?" "when I or he will go," are rarely used, and when used, the *will* is not auxiliary.

The distinctions in the use of *shall* and *will* have been, and probably will continue, variable. In the received translation of the Scriptures, the use of *shall* indicating the future predominates; in more modern usage, there is a tendency to give the preference to *will*. But in Scotland, and in the more southern part of this country, this tendency is quite in advance of the normal state of the language, the state which we have endeavored to indicate by the preceding illustrations. A Scotchman or a Southerner might not say, "I will drown, nobody shall help me;" but it would probably be because he would rather use *will* in both cases. At least, he would be tempted to say, "I will certainly drown, nobody will help me." This tendency to substitute *will* for *shall* may have a moral in it, as indicating the prevailing tendency of modern times to exalt the personal *will*, and forget the idea of obligation.

Should and *would* are used as auxiliaries, precisely after the analogy of *shall* and *will*, first, to express a future sense,

in the *sermone obliquo*, and in dependence on a verb in the past instead of the present tense ; as, "he said it would rain to-day," "he thought he should go to-morrow," &c., corresponding to, "he says it will rain," "he thinks he shall go," &c. Secondly, to express a future sense either in or under a condition ; as, "the tree would fall if they took, or should take, the prop away," "I should sink if you did not support me," "if he should come, I will send him." Here we have, for the first time, reached a *modal* distinction.

Should have and *would have* form compound tenses after the analogy of *shall have* and *will have*.

When *should* or *would* is used in an absolute or independent proposition, as, "he should do this," "he would not do that," they are no longer auxiliary but principal verbs, having no longer a merely formal use, but a proper intrinsic sense, and so to be translated into other languages.

May is used as an auxiliary, after a conjunction, or indefinite relative, first, sometimes perhaps, but rarely, in propositions expressing contingency, with *if*, *though*, *whoever*, &c., as, "though it may rain I shall go," "though it rain, or though it should rain, &c.," "whoever may come," &c. Secondly, more frequently, expressing a contingent end with the conjunction *that*, as, "I desire that you may be happy," "I fear that he may be hurt," "I eat that I may live," &c. Thirdly, still more frequently followed by the subject, and used optatively, as, "may he prosper."

Its preterite *might* has an analogous use ; as, "he desired that you might be chosen," "this was done that it might be fulfilled," &c. But the auxiliaries *may* and *might* may very frequently be omitted, or *should* may be substituted for either of them, except No. 3.

In all direct assertions, whether in the principal proposition, as, "he may go or stay," "he might go if he would," &c., or in a dependent proposition, as, "he says that you may go," &c.,—*may* and *might* retain their proper intrinsic force, and consequently are not auxiliary verbs. This is by far their most frequent use.

Shall, *will*, and *may*, when principal verbs, like *can*, *must*, and *ought*, being defective, are used in the future, as well as the present, in their simple form. In like manner, their preterites, together with that of *can*, are used not only for the simple

preterite, but for the conditional ; as, “when he could go he would not,” “if he could go he would not,” “he might go if he would,” &c. If it be said that *shall* and *will*, even though they should be admitted to be sometimes principal verbs, must yet always express the future tense, we answer that they are no more necessarily future than, “he cannot go,” “he is not able to go,” or, “he may not go,” “he is not permitted to go,” &c. And if always and necessarily future in English, why not in Latin, French, or German, when the corresponding words are often in the present tense? The infinitive after any verb in the present tense commonly expresses a future idea with reference to the meaning of the former verb ; as, “he desires to learn,” “he allows you to speak ;” yet this does not alter the tense of the “desires” or the “allows” taken by itself.

Let is used as an auxiliary, to express a command or a desire with respect to a subject in the first or third person ; as, “let us sing,” “so let it be,” “let him go if he dares,” “let there be light.”

It must be observed that *let* is also used as a principal verb, with a complete conjugation, including even such forms as those given above. So that we are to determine whether it is auxiliary in such cases, simply by determining whether or not it has abandoned its own intrinsic sense to serve a merely formal or modal use.

If “let us sing” is addressed to a second person as such, and means “please to let us sing,” or, “I order you to let us sing,” then *let* is a principal verb governing an infinitive. If it is used merely to express a wish, or a sort of mutual exhortation with a view to our singing, and is equivalent to “sing we,” or “may we sing,” then *let* is auxiliary, and the following verb is in the imperative. So with the other cases. If I say, “let him go,” not addressing or thinking of any second person, but simply in the way of a defiance or challenge to *him*, *let* is auxiliary ; as, “let him go if he will.” But if in so saying I command another to let *him* go, it is a principal verb ; as, “let him go instantly, or you will repent it.”

In the phrase, “let there be light,” as expressing the *fiat* of the Almighty, it is manifest that *let* must be auxiliary. No party in the second person is addressed either expressly or impliedly, whether present or absent, whether definite or

indefinite. It is a simple expression of *will* that light should be, equivalent to the almost obsolete phrase, "be there light;" as we may still say, "be there few or many, it is all the same.

One peculiarity accompanying *let* as an auxiliary is to be noted. It was originally an active verb, and, as such, governed an infinitive with its subject in the accusative case. This form of construction remains even after *let* has lost its proper meaning and become a mere auxiliary. Therefore the subject of the principal verb — now by the help of the auxiliary become a *finite* verb — here stands in the accusative case. If such is the fact, it should be met boldly and recognized as a fact. If any are scandalized by such a result, it remains for them to give a better solution. We do not see what better can be given by any who recognize *let* as an auxiliary verb.

It ought to be added, in regard to most of the auxiliary verbs, that there are not only cases in which, on our principles, they are clearly auxiliary, and others in which they are clearly principal verbs, but others still wherein it is doubtful which they are, the two extremes passing into each other by minute gradations. But this need constitute no real objection in the mind of one who seeks the whole and simple truth. Let each extreme be recognized as such, and let the intermediate cases be recognized as such, when they occur. The actual facts are to be ascertained and stated, and that is all.

We are now prepared to make our distribution of the finite moods.

First, the indicative may be defined as usual.

Secondly, when *should* or *would* is used as an auxiliary in a principal proposition conditional upon another proposition, as, "I should buy it if I had the means," "the house would fall if it were not propped up," &c., we have what may be called the conditional mood, or the potential mood, if one will. It is all that remains of a potential mood, and might well be included under the indicative, as a future with a preteritive conditional form. Compare "if he should go I shall go," with "if he should go I should go."

Thirdly, when, after a conjunction or conjunctive pronoun, a condition or an end is expressed contingently, either with

a peculiar form of the verb, or with the auxiliary *may* or *should* in the present, *might* or *should* in the preterite, (not *could* nor *would*,) and in like manner together with *have* for the perfect and preterperfect, — we have what may be called the conjunctive or subjunctive mood. Examples have already been given.

Fourthly, when a command, &c., is expressed, either with the simple verb, or with the auxiliary *may* or *let*; as, "go home," "come one, come all," "long live the king," "thy kingdom come," "descend we now to particulars," "come we that love," &c. "may you succeed," "may we all get home," "so may it be," "so let it be," "so be it," "let us make man," "let there be light," &c., — we have what may be called the imperative mood. In the phrases, "have done with that," "begone," we have what seem to be remnants of an imperative *perfect*.

These hints on English moods and auxiliaries are thrown out with many misgivings. They do not profess to be a full development of the subject, but only a hasty and imperfect sketch. The essay, nevertheless, we are confident, is in the right direction, tending to make the theory of English conjugation more consistent with itself, with philosophical views, and with the conjugational systems of other languages, both ancient and modern. But if not only this essay is a failure, but the object aimed at is absolutely unattainable, then we have no hesitation in saying, that we should prefer to fall back upon the first or the third of the methods above described for distinguishing the moods in English, rather than upon the second.

To return to Professor Fowler. It seems hardly consistent in him to say that the verb is in the infinitive, and consequently, by his definition, has *no subject*, after *can*, *shall*, *will*, &c., page 257.

We observe that he has given "let him be," "let them be," "let him love," &c. as the third person imperative of those verbs respectively; which agrees with our view given above; but he has not consistently adhered to it. Why not give "let us be" also? Under his definition of the imperative, he has inserted "let us *stay*" as an illustration of *stay* in that mood. Yet on page 522, he says, "a verb in the imperative mood is sometimes used absolutely, having no direct

reference to any particular subject addressed; as, 'let there be light.' Now, if *let* were considered a principal verb in the imperative mood here, this statement might seem to have an object at least, whatever might be thought of its sufficiency as an explanation; — but if *let* is auxiliary, and *be* is here in the imperative third person, the statement seems to us perfectly aimless and unmeaning.

In the future perfect of the subjunctive, the forms *shall have* and *will have* are both given; as far as we can recollect, the form, "if I, you, or *he will have loved*," is rarely if ever used.

Under "beware," (page 308) it should be added that such forms as "If he beware," "he may or should beware," &c. are also used.

An effort seems to be made, by frequent and earnest repetition, to prove that conjunctions always connect sentences, never words. But we confess we are not convinced. We propose such phrases as the following: "He seeks to connect wisdom and folly together," or, "a brave and wise man will, &c." "A and B and C and D &c., up to a hundred, are worth five dollars." Here, says Latham, are a hundred propositions in one. If so, they must each of them be false, or only a hundredth part of the truth. "A hundred oranges are worth five dollars." Does not that sentence really contain as many propositions as the other? And must every plural number, then, make a compound proposition?

Page 324 contains some very striking views on some points in the structure of language; so enthusiastic, indeed, as to run almost over into transcendentalism.

The calls, *coh! coh!* addressed to cows; *k'nan! k'nan!* to sheep; *pig! pig!* to pigs; *haw! gee! hwo!* to draught cattle, &c.; as well as *lo! see! behold!* addressed to our fellow-men, — are denominated "natural exclamations." In what sense *natural*? As all ordinary expressions are natural? Or, did the Scythians call their sheep with *k'nan, k'nan*; their cows with *coh, coh*; and their pigs with *pig, pig*? And do the Tartars and Arabs use these same "natural exclamations" still? Or do they all call to one another, *behold, see*? For our part, we see not why *coh!* may not be connected with *come* and *cow*; and *k'nan* or *k'nanny* with *come nanny*, which is as *naturally* addressed to a sheep as *k'jack*, or *come Jack*, addressed to a horse. *Pig!* is certainly a very *natu-*

ral address to an English *pig*; and in this sense, they are all as "natural exclamations" as *behold!* *see!*

In treating of prefixes, *gain*, *can*, *with*, *re*, and perhaps the Greek *ἀνά*, might have furnished some very striking comparisons.

Can may be the etymological correspondent of *gain*, and passes into *contra*. *Gain* — German *gegen*, as prefix *ge* — passes into *again*, *against*, equivalent to *re* and *contra*. *With* is equivalent to *con* or *contra*. In Anglo-Saxon, the *contra* prevailed; in English, the *con* prevails, though the force of *contra* still remains in such phrases as "to fight with." It is etymologically connected with the German, *wider* = *against*, and *wieder* = *again*. *Re* combines the ideas of *again* and *against*. In Latin compositions, *against* or *back* prevails; in English modern compositions, *again* is the almost uniform sense. The same two ideas are connected under the Greek *ἀνά*.

Now compare the words, *withhold*, *widerhalten*, *retain*, *gegenhalten*, *contain*, (in the sense of *restrain*) and *ἀνέχειν*: *gain* — *say*, *Gegenspruch*, *contradict*, *redire*, *widersagen*, *ἀναφθέγγουαι*: *withstand*, *widerstehen*, *resist*, *gainstrive*, *contend*, *ἀνίστημι*.

The connection between concomitancy and opposition, between opposition and retroaction, and retroaction and repetition, is remarkable. The transition of thought, at first seeming so inexplicable, can be tolerably well traced out; thus, from *being with*, through *coming together*, to *coming against*; and from *coming against*, through *coming back* to a former point, to *coming again*; "together" forming the connecting link in one case, and back (*retro*) in the other. In *ἀνά* the transition seems to be from *up*, through *over-again*, to *against*.

The prevailing distinction between the more ancient or foreign sense of *re*, and the more modern or English sense, may be seen by comparing such words as, *react*, *recede*, *rebound*, *remove*, *resign*, *resolve*, *return*, with *re-act*, *re-cede*, *re-bound*, *re-move*, *re-sign*, *re-solve*, *re-turn*. It seldom, if ever, meant precisely *again* in Latin composition. In some purely English compositions, it does indeed mean *against* or *back*; yet, almost always in English compositions, and always in newly formed words, it implies mere repetition; as, *reassemble*, *rebuild*, *rewrite*, *recommend*, &c.

"Misprise" is said to be from *mis* + *pre* + *hend*. Is it not rather from *mis* + *pretium*? "Misadvise" is said to be from

✓^{vis}. Is it not rather from *animadverto*, *adverto*, *advertir*, *avis*, *advertise*, *advise*? And by the way, would it not be *plainer* to call this sign ✓, the *radical*, rather than the “surd” sign.

How is the usage of the prefix *in*, sometimes with an *intensive* and sometimes with a *negative* force, to be explained? Is the signification *against* the mediating idea? Or is its origin entirely different in the two cases; the negative being etymologically connected with the Greek *ἀνευ*, the German *ohne* and *un*, the English *un*, and the Latin *sine*?

The derivation of the English *not* from *ne* + *whit*, (like the German *nicht* from *ne* + *icht* = *etwas*,)—furnishes an instructive comparison with the French modes of negation; as *ne pas*, *ne point*, &c.

Some curious derivations are given under words of French origin (page 407); among which we note particularly *bachelor* from *bas chevalier*, *curfew* from *couvre-feu*, and *kerchief* from *couvre-chef*. We add, that perhaps no language, short of that of the Celestials, can equal the *naïve* juxtaposition of the following English expression: “A linen cambric-pocket handkerchief;” that is, “a linen-cambrick pocket-hand-cover-head.” The derivation of *Esquire*, through the Spanish and French, from the Latin *scutum*, might have been mentioned as scarcely less curious than the other.

Under “Illusive Etymologies” there is a very laughable collection, showing that vulgar instinct, though sure as inspiration, in its proper province of step by step processes, commits strange blunders when it ventures upon distant etymological comparisons.

This whole essay on “Derivation” bears evident marks of being the result of original research, and is a most valuable contribution to English Philology. The mass of facts it contains is enormous, and the labor of investigation, of patient and accurate study which it must have required, would fill the uninitiated with amazement. How immense the contrast between such a thorough, systematic, and accurate, yet unpretending essay, and so many catchpenny works on this subject which we daily meet with,—works without scholarship, without critical ability, without geniality of any kind, got up at second, or rather third, fourth, or fifth hand, gathered from others’ scraps and leavings,

“In denen man der Menschheit Schnitzel kräuselt,”

yet recommended, it may be, by half the D. D.'s, LL. D.'s, Professors, School Committees, and Schoolmasters in the country ! We remember to have once seen a book of this kind entitled, "An Analysis of the derivative Words in the English Language; or a key to their precise Analytic Definitions, by Prefixes and Suffixes; designed to furnish an easy and expeditious Method of acquiring a Knowledge of their component (?) Parts: Twenty-first edition, carefully revised, enlarged, and adapted to Schools of all grades." After such a flourish of trumpets, one finds a book absolutely swarming with such luminous and logical statements as the following: "Divisibility is the property or *quality capable* of being divided;" "Compressibility, the *quality* that *may be* pressed together;" "Irrepressible, not capable of being pressed *again*;" "Divine is a *quality* pertaining to *Divinity*. Divinity is the state of being *divine* or deity. Moral is a *quality* pertaining to actions. Morality is the very *essence* of *that quality*, or the *thing itself*." "N. B. In some cases, the prefix *ex* does little else than add emphasis; as, *exact*, *very exact*; *extreme*, to the *very end*," &c.

But such comparisons are *extreme*, and we will pursue them no farther. We take leave of Professor Gibbs for the present with profound respect, hoping to meet him again ere long, in some more extended work in this department.

On page 558 of the Grammar, "all fled but he" is said to be equivalent to "all fled, but he did not fly." Is *fled*, then, the grammatical preterite of *fly*? "all fled but him," is placed upon a par with the former phrase for grammatical accuracy. We doubt. There may perhaps be sufficient usage, besides that of Mrs. Hemans, to authorize the latter form; but the best usage is unquestionably for the former; and according to grammatical analogy, the case after *but* should be treated just as the case after *than*.

The doctrine of verbs with two accusatives, (page 480,) needs a more consistent development in connection with that of the "modal government" of verbs, (page 529.) An accusative subject of an infinitive ought by all means to be recognized in English; as, "I believed him to be a good man," "we found him absent," that is, "to be absent," &c. For want of it, what shall we make of the following statement, page 535? "Some verbs are immediately followed by an

infinitive when the object is the same as the subject, but are followed by the accusative and the infinitive when the object is different; as, "I wish to go," "I wish him to go." Is *myself* the object of wish in the first case, or *him* in the last? Is not the infinitive *to go* the true object of the *wishing* in both cases, *I* being the subject of the *going* in one case, and *him* in the other?

Must the noun followed by the participial or verbal noun always be placed in the genitive with it? May we not say, for example, "as to the army of the allies remaining in winter quarters," &c. ? construing "the army remaining" as a sort of compound object or idea, like the infinitive and its accusative in such phrases as, "I saw a watch advertised at the post-office;" "they declared John to have forfeited his kingdom?"

With the words *like*, *nigh*, *near*, *next*, &c., as well as with such verbs as *give*, *tell*, &c., it would have been better fully to recognize a *Dative* case; the existence of which in English is several times alluded to, but without sufficient courage openly to adopt it. The objective case of *nouns* is not distinguished by *form* from their nominative. That we have no peculiar form of nouns or pronouns for the *Dative*, is, therefore, no objection to its recognition, especially when it is considered that the so-called objective forms of pronouns were many of them, in fact, originally *Datives*.

In regard to such phrases as "three first," or "first three," &c., there has been much grammatical philosophizing — which is almost always bad philosophy. Professor Fowler gives no preference to either, but says, "each order is justified by respectable usage." This is true; and we would imitate his indulgent and catholic spirit. Nevertheless, we must be permitted to think that the best usage in English, as in all other languages, the plainest analogy, the most *natural tendency*, and, we will add, the soundest philosophy, are in favor of the form which places the cardinal number before the ordinal, when the objects are considered separately one by one, and not by twos, threes, &c. So far as any reasoning has been brought to bear against this usage, *first* is allowed and maintained to be of the nature of a superlative degree, as it undoubtedly is. Must we then reject all plurality of the superlative, — and if so, on *philosophical principles*, in English, then by parity of reasoning in all other languages also?

and must we declare "the greatest, the wisest, and the most learned men of all nations" to be utterly absurd and ridiculous?"

Numerals are called *definite* on page 494, *one* among the rest; but on page 452, *a* or *an* (another form of *one*) is declared to "mark an object as *indefinite*, but with less precision than the *numeral*." Less *precisely indefinite*? So the "but" seems to imply.

As an illustration of the improper omission of the article, the phrase is cited, "and the Pharisees and Scribes murmured;" and it is added, "*the* should be inserted before *Scribes* to signify that they were a class distinct from the Pharisees." The precise phrase condemned we do not find in the New Testament, from which it does not indeed profess, but is naturally presumed, to have been taken. *Similar* phrases occur in Matthew v. 20, and xii. 38, &c., where, in the Greek as well as in the English, the article is omitted. Why is it that, when scholars, by a most diligent and devout study and collation of the Greek language, have determined its idioms, usages, and dialects, they humbly bow to them as facts, — facts worthy often of profound meditation and reflection in order to discover their *rationale* and curious mechanism, — without ever thinking of charging the Greek with grammatical errors, solecisms, blunders, and bad philosophy; and yet when they turn to the English, they lose at once all their respect for usage and fact, and boldly condemn any thing as improper, erroneous, and unphilosophical, which does not square exactly with their preconceived notions? But English usage deserves respect as well as classical usage, even in its diversities, its variations, its anomalies.

Following the lead of Lowth and Harrison, objection is made to the insertion of the article in the Centurion's exclamation, "Truly this was *the* Son of God;" — on insufficient grounds we think, though Harrison's blundering reasons are not stated in full. The passage about the contention of Paul and Barnabas is misquoted in the same form in which it is given by Harrison, but referred expressly to Acts xv. 39. Professor Fowler would seem therefore to have traced the passage to its original source; but any one who will take the trouble to consult the English text will find it entirely innocent of the mistakes here gravely charged upon it. Harrison is a broken staff to lean upon.

Under the rule of attraction, (on page 512,) an accusative case is allowed to do the office of the nominative; as, "Him I accuse has entered." *Coriolanus*, v. 5. May not this well be remembered in connection with the forms, "let him go," "let us pray," &c.? This rule of attraction is fully recognized in the classical languages; thus, "*Urbem quam statuo, vestra est.*" *Æn.* i. 573. It should also be applied in explanation of the partially adjective use of the compound relative *what*. Compare the phrases, "I give what stores I have," "what stores I have I give," "what stores are there I give," "what things were gain those I counted loss." Here the noun "stores" is as much the accusative of "give" in one case as in the other, and "things" is the accusative of "counted;" except so far as this construction may be modified by the law of attraction.

Under the "Government of Verbs," the old phrase is repeated, that an active verb always "signifies an action *affecting* an object." But when we say, "he saw Saturn," which was the object *affected* by the *seeing*, *he* or *Saturn*?

The use of *have* in the sense of obligation or necessity; as, "I had to do this," is formally taken up under two separate heads on the same page, and once or twice elsewhere; while its causative use, as, "I had a coat made," is nowhere alluded to. In such phrases as, "I had to do this," the *have* is treated as an *auxiliary*, on page 265. It is remarkable that the French future seems to be formed by suffixing the present tense of *avoir* to the infinitive of the verb. But in what mood and tense "I had to go" is to be considered in English, this Grammar has not informed us.

"I intended to have written" is a frequent blunder, and deservedly reprehended. Yet perhaps some reserve should be made from its absolute condemnation. What is there wrong, for example, in the following construction: "I intended to have written him before he left the city?"

We find here repeated again the oft repeated statement of Dr. Webster in his *Dissertations*, that it is a peculiarity of the preterite tense after *if*, as, "if I were," "if I had," "if it rained," &c., to imply negation of the fact. It is high time this statement should be modified, if not corrected. It would hardly do to say that the Latin *fuit* implies negation of existence; and yet such is its office sometimes. Only two

pages before the quotation from Webster, occurs the following: "Were he to read hard the next six months, he would probably be admitted to the bar;" where it is properly said the sign of the condition, *if*, is omitted. So in cases of oblique statement generally; as, "I will go with you, for I said, if I were at leisure, you should have my company;" "Here is the book, for I said, if I had it, it should be at your service;" "He went in the rain, for he said, if it rained, he would certainly go," &c.

What shall we say of such a phrase as, "I should think he was thirty years old?" Shall we substitute *is* for *was*; or shall we admit that a preterite form may sometimes be used, with a present sense, in consequence of its dependence upon a preceding preterite form? And shall we utterly condemn the following construction: "He said that the men before the flood used to believe there *was* a God?" See page 539, at bottom.

We are glad to meet with another rebuke of such awkward phrases as, "the house is being built;" although it cannot be denied that they are creeping into current, and perhaps, we must even confess, into good, use. In some cases, also, the other forms, like "the house is building," would be equally or more awkward; but then it is probably better to resort to a circumlocution.

"By sending them;" "by sending of them;" "by the sending them;" and "by the sending of them," are all recognized as good authority, Mr. Harrison to the contrary notwithstanding, (p. 543.)

The use of the word *may*, in the phrase, "I eat that I may live," is said to "denote that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity of performing the other." To this view we strongly demur. It is not for the sake of having the *power* to perform the other, (which might or might not be exercised,) but for the sake of actually performing it. "I eat in order to live," expresses the same idea without any allusion whatever to *power*. And in other languages, as the Greek and Latin, &c., it would be expressed, and fully expressed, whether by the infinitive or subjunctive, without any such allusion. The English phrase *may* indeed have reference to *power*, if we will, though such is not its ordinary meaning; and a corresponding sense may also be expressed

in other languages, but only by an additional verb signifying *to be able*, and corresponding to *may*; though even then, that verb must still be in the subjunctive or infinitive mood. How would Professor Fowler analyze on his principles the phrase, "I eat that I may be able to live?"

The subjunctive mood after *that* is also used in English without any auxiliary expressed, but often with essentially the same meaning as in the other cases when the auxiliary is employed; as, "I move that the house adjourn;" "I fear lest they be lost," or, "that they may be lost;" "grant that we fall into no sin, (or may not fall into any sin,) but that all our doings may be righteous;" "I demand that the question be taken (or may be taken) by yeas and nays," &c.

On page 629, there occurs another misquotation of Scripture, to illustrate the figures of speech. In a single verse, the first "gift" and "down" are omitted, "light" is put for "lights," "there" is inserted, and "nor" is put for "neither." It does not appear that the passage is improved after all; nor does it appear that there was any intention to improve it. It seems to be only a case of second-hand *memoriter* quotation. It is dangerous to quote the Scriptures, or indeed any thing else, at second-hand. Scarcely any quotation can be relied upon until it is compared with the original text.

We have nothing further to say on the parts relating to Rhetorical and Poetical Forms, which we doubt not are very good in their place.* We shall only add that a considerable portion of the syntactical part might, to our apprehension, have been greatly improved by a more rigid practical application of rhetorical and logical principles. We refer to such cases of prolixity, repetitions, clumsy and vicious arrangement, as one may find exemplified on pages 522–526, (conf. 477, &c.) 536, 537, 554–556. *Barbarism*, *impropriety*, and *solecism* are all confounded on page 587, the very next page after they were so carefully distinguished.

But all such blemishes — and though we do not profess to have referred to them all, we certainly have not been sparing in our censures — all such blemishes are slight in comparison with the sterling merit of the work we have had under

* Is Da Vinci's Last Supper in the *Cathedral* of Milan? So it is stated on page 595.

examination ; and so many of them as are really blemishes will doubtless be corrected in a second edition. Such a work, involving such a multiplicity and commingling of details, and calling for a reconciliation of so many conflicting analogies and jarring authorities, could not be thrown off in a perfect form at once. Happy may the author think himself, if he makes a tolerably satisfactory approximation to perfection at the second trial.

We doubt not we have ourselves committed many oversights even in our censures — a fault far less pardonable than oversights in an original essay. But as we have made our criticisms, not in any unkind or carping spirit, but simply with a desire to promote, so far as our small abilities might reach, the common cause of grammatical science, and, we may add, to contribute our modicum of aid towards the perfecting of a work which has already made so encouraging an approach towards what a Grammar of the English language ought to be ; — we trust *our* errors, too, may meet with indulgence.

The beau ideal of English Grammar never can be reached while it is treated as a mere art of parsing, a mere school-boy's hornbook. The English language must be studied in connection with the languages that have gone before it, and especially with its own earlier forms, — in its whole historical development. And not only so. It is not enough to go beyond a narrow and isolated view ; it is not enough to go beyond the analogies and authorities of the classical languages even ; we must also go beyond the old English and Anglo-Saxon, if we would have a thorough and scholarly development of English Philology. We must bring the English language into comparison with its *neighbors* and with *languages in general* — with an enlarged science of language. We shall then find that much of our private philosophizing upon the narrow data of one language, and the preconceived notions of one mind, is practically demolished by the higher philosophy of the human mind as revealed in the wonderful mechanism of universal human speech.